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Rape Trauma. Syndrome: Interest of the
Victim and Neutral Experts
Jeffrey T. Waddlet and Mark Partstf
Rape Trauma Syndrome (RTS) consists of the emotional, be-
havioral and physical symptoms that are common among victims
of nonconsensual sexual intercourse.' RTS received attention first
from the psychiatric community in the mid-1970s2 and then from
the legal community in the early 1980s.s Although its use in court-
room proceedings is not wholly accepted, the existence of RTS is
undeniably often part of the aftermath of rape. "Rape is primarily
an act of violence with sex as the weapon. Thus it is not surprising
that the victim experiences a syndrome with specific symp-
tomology as a result of the attack made upon her."" While the exis-
tence of RTS is today generally accepted, there are still difficulties
with the use of evidence concerning RTS.
The most frequently discussed and most controversial use of
RTS evidence is for the purpose of demonstrating lack of consent
in a rape trial. Typically, the prosecution presents expert testi-
mony about the presence of RTS in the victim's psychological pro-
file. The presence of RTS suggests an incident of nonconsensual
sexual intercourse. When deciding whether to admit testimony, a
court will decide whether the expert testimony will help the jury
reach a conclusion on a subject beyond its experience. A trial court
will also weigh the expert testimony's probative value against
whether the testimony will be prejudicial, confusing, or misleading
to the jury.5 While there is still substantial disagreement about ad-
t A.B. 1986, Dartmouth College; J.D. Candidate 1990, University of Chicago.
tt B.A. 1983, Butler University; M.S. 1984, Northwestern University; J.D. Candidate
1990, University of Chicago.
See Part I below for a complete medical and psychological description of RTS.
The term "Rape Trauma Syndrome" was coined by Ann Wolbert Burgess and Linda
Lytle Holmstrom in a report of their study of rape victims who were patients at Boston City
Hospital's emergency room. Ann Wolbert Burgess and Linda Lytle Holmstrom, Rape
Trauma Syndrome, 131 Am J Psych 981 (1974).
' Kansas was the first state to allow the admission of RTS evidence. In State v Marks,
231 Kan 645, 647 P2d 1292 (1982), the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the admission of RTS
evidence as relevant to the issue of consent.
' Burgess and Holmstrom, 131 Am J Psych at 982 (cited in note 2).
5 See State v Saldana, 324 NW2d 227, 229 (Minn 1982). Note that the usual standard
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missibility, both courts' and commentators 7 have provided exhaus-
tive discussions of the scientific and legal issues involved in this
threshold inquiry. Thus, this comment does not directly address
the issue of admissibility. Instead, this comment discusses the con-
sequences for the rape victim of allowing discovery and admission
of RTS evidence and argues that the use of court-appointed ex-
perts could mitigate some of the negative effects that the proce-
dures for admitting RTS evidence can have on the victim in a rape
trial.
This comment has three parts. Part I examines RTS, how it is
diagnosed, the controversy regarding its reliability, and its eviden-
tiary significance. Part II analyzes the defendant's constitutional
rights of access to and use of RTS evidence under the Due Process
and Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses, as well as the
for the admissibility of scientific evidence is the Frye test, first set out in Frye v United
States, 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923). Under the Frye test, to be admissible scientific evidence
must be derived from a scientific principle "sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id at 1014. In Spencer v General
Elec. Co., 688 F Supp 1072, 1076 (E D Va 1988), the court held that RTS evidence did not
satisfy the Frye test, nor did it merit admission under the FRE 403 balancing test. For state
cases applying the Frye test to RTS evidence, see Saldana, 324 NW2d at 230; People v
Bledsoe, 203 Cal Rptr 450, 681 P2d 291, 297 (1984) (holding RTS was a therapeutic tool
that did not meet the Frye test as a means of proving a rape had occurred); People v Hamp-
ton, 746 P2d 947, 955 (holding RTS failed to meet the Frye test). For a discussion of RTS
and the Frye test, see David McCord, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding
Rape Trauma Syndrome in Rape Prosecutions, 26 BC L Rev 1143, 1181-97 (1985).
6 Other states besides Kansas in Marks, 647 P2d at 1299, allow admission of RTS evi-
dence on the issue of consent. These states include Montana, State v Liddell, 211 Mont 180,
685 P2d 918, 923 (1984); Arizona, State v Huey, 145 Ariz 59, 699 P2d 1290, 1294 (1985);
West Virginia, State v McCoy, 366 SE2d 731, 737 (W Va 1988); Maryland, State v Allewalt,
308 Md 89, 517 A2d 741, 752 (1986) (allowing RTS evidence under the name Post-Trau-
matic Stress Disorder, a tactic which could legitimately serve to combat an overvaluation
problem). See also decisions from Pennsylvania, Com. v Gallagher, 353 Pa Super 426, 510
A2d 735, 744 (1986); and Colorado, Hampton, 746 P2d at 952, which allow RTS evidence to
explain a delay in reporting a rape.
For cases barring admission of RTS evidence, see decisions from Minnesota, Saldana,
324 NW2d at 230; and Washington, State v Black 46 Wash App 259, 730 P2d 698, 701
(1986), aff'd en banc, 109 Wash 2d 336, 745 P2d 12 (holding RTS not well enough accepted
in relevant scientific community to be generally accepted). See also cases from Missouri,
State v Taylor, 663 SW2d 235, 240 (Mo 1984) (disallowing evidence using RTS terminology,
but allowing evidence of trauma or stress); Michigan, People v Pullins, 145 Mich App 414,
378 NW2d 502, 505 (1985) (withholding judgment on RTS, but confirming the Frye test as
the standard); and California, Bledsoe, 681 P2d at 297 (disallowing RTS evidence, but al-
lowing testimony on emotional and psychological trauma).
' For analyses adopting opposite positions, compare McCord, 26 BC L Rev 1143 (cited
in note 5) (advocating admissibility of RTS evidence) with Note, Checking the Allure of
Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syn-
drome in Criminal Proceedings, 70 Va L Rev 1657 (1984) (advocating inadmissibility of
RTS evidence).
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defendant's statutory rights under rape shield laws. Part II con-
cludes that the defendant has rights to discover and introduce neg-
ative RTS results only where the prosecution has introduced posi-
tive RTS results in the trial. Finally, Part III proposes the court
appointment of a neutral expert, under the provisions of Federal
Rule of Evidence 706, to minimize the harm to the victim when a
party wishes to introduce RTS evidence at trial. This section of
the comment argues that both the victim's and the defendant's in-
terests would be properly protected through such a rule.
I. MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF RTS
Researchers have divided RTS into two phases." The first
phase of RTS is known as the acute phase. It is marked by ex-
treme fear. The victim sometimes openly expresses this fear and
sometimes controls her observable reactions and appears calm.,
Physical symptoms can include skeletal muscle tension, sleep dis-
turbances, and gastrointestinal and genitourinary problems.10 The
second phase of RTS often begins two to three weeks after the at-
tack.1 This is the period when the victim attempts to reorganize
her life. Women during this phase often develop specific fears con-
nected with the events of the rape. For example, women who were
raped in open spaces may develop a fear of the outdoors while
those raped at home may develop a fear of indoors. These phobias
are often accompanied by nightmares involving specific incidents
of the rape. Many women move during this phase, change tele-
phone numbers or take other steps to hide their identity. During
the second phase of RTS, many women change their sexual behav-
ior and attitudes. 2
' See, for example, Burgess and Holmstrom, 131 Am J Psych at 982 (cited in note 2).
Some researchers have broken RTS into three stages, with the second stage consisting of a
denial that the rape occurred. This is a transitional phase between the two major phases
which are widely recognized. See Bonnie J. Buchele and James P. Buchele, Legal and Psy-
chological Issues in the Use of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 25 Wash-
burn L J 26, 28 (1985).
9 See Burgess and Holmstrom, 131 Am J Psych at 982 (cited in note 2), and The Rape
Victim in the Emergency Ward, 73 Am J Nursing 1741, 1743 (1973).
Burgess and Holmstrom, 131 Am J Psych at 982-83 (cited in note 2).
Id at 982.
12 Id at 984. See In Matter of Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 428 A2d 126, 138 (Pa
1987) (Larsen dissenting). The dissent recounted the following, typical RTS experience:
I experienced so much during those first two months: hurt, anxiety, anger, frustra-
tion, humiliation, and worst of all, the sense that I was having a nervous break-
down. I thought that my feelings were not normal. I couldn't even sleep with my
husband-a man to whom I had been married for nine years. I couldn't under-
stand what was happening. Would I ever be able to put this ordeal behind me?
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Evidence of RTS is elicited primarily through the establish-
ment of a patient/therapist relationship.13 The psychological symp-
toms can be elicited through standard psychological examinations.
The diagnostician would look for such factors as intrusive reexper-
iencing of the event (through dreams or flashbacks), a numbing of
emotional responses, memory impairment or trouble concentrating,
and avoidance of situations which recall the event." Physical
symptoms, such as acute startle reflex, can also be identified
through a physical examination. All victims do not exhibit the
same symptoms in the same order. Symptoms may vary as a result
of conditions under which the rape occurred; such factors include
the degree of violence involved in the rape and the victim's famili-
arity with the rapist."5 This fact does not destroy the usefulness
and validity of RTS to prove lack of consent. The fact that many
physical ailments provoke a wide variety of symptoms in different
patients does not create insuperable barriers to the physician's
diagnosis. 6
RTS can only be induced through a nonconsensual sexual inci-
dent. 1 7 There is, however, a related syndrome, Post-traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD), which can be provoked by a variety of
traumatic incidents.' Rare, traumatic incidents which can trigger
See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 87 (Harvard University Press
1987).
" Buchele and Buchele, 25 Washburn L J at 38 (cited in note 8). One of the reasons
courts have refused to admit RTS evidence in the past is that RTS is sometimes perceived
as a therapeutic tool rather than as a fact-finding tool. See Saldana, 324 NW2d at 230. In
Bledsoe, 681 P2d at 300-01, the court stated that RTS "does not consist of a relatively
narrow set of criteria or symptoms whose presence demonstrates that the client or patient
had been raped; rather .. . it is an 'umbrella' concept, reflecting the broad range of emo-
tional trauma experienced by clients of rape counselors." One of the original uses of RTS,
however, was to recognize that a woman had been raped when she did not voluntarily report
it. See Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma
Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 Minn L Rev
395, 449 (1985).
" American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders 238 (3d ed 1980) ("DSM-III"). Note that the factors listed in DSM-III apply to Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The relation between RTS and PTSD is explored in
notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
" Massaro, 69 Minn L Rev at 429 (cited in note 13).
" Id at 429 n 148.
" Note, however, that victims of attempted rape may experience symptoms very simi-
lar to those suffered by rape victims. Becker, Skinner, Abel, Howell and Bruce, The Effects
of Sexual Assault on Rape and Attempted Rape Victims, 7 Victimology 106, 112 (1983).
"8 Some researchers classify RTS as simply a subset of PTSD. See Buchele, 25 Wash-
burn L Rev at 29 (cited in note 8). Furthermore, some diagnosticians list rape as an event
which can trigger PTSD. See DSM-III at 236 (cited in note 14). Some courts refer to RTS as
PTSD; see Allewalt, 517 A2d.at 748 ("RTS is the terminology used by some for a PTSD
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the disorder include earthquakes, airplane crashes or torture. 19
There are ways of pinpointing a rape as the source of a trau-
matic reaction, thereby ruling out other events as the cause. For
example, the development of phobias related specifically to the cir-
cumstances surrounding an attack may suggest that a victim was
raped. 20 Many women with RTS lose interest in sexual relations 2
1
and develop a fear of men, both of which would be unusual symp-
toms for people exposed to other forms of trauma.2 2 In Pittsburgh
Action Against Rape,2" Judge Larsen described the unique nature
of the trauma suffered by rape victims:
The depth and range of emotional and psychological dis-
turbance is not felt by the victims of most other crimes.
Trauma is the natural consequence of any violent crime.
However, many of the symptoms of rape trauma syn-
drome will not be experienced with any degree of regular-
ity by victims of non-rape crimes. Little anguish over the
role the non-rape victim might have played is likely (ex-
cept, perhaps, for a feeling that one might have been
careless or gullible). Rarely is a robbery, or even assault,
victim traumatized over possible contributory behavior.
Certainly no social rebuke is forthcoming for the usual
non-rape victim-society will not look askance at that
victim .... 24
Despite these distinctive diagnostic aspects, there are two
methodological problems with RTS evidence. The first arises in
the case where the rape victim has been raped in the past, an un-
fortunately common occurrence.2 5 One study has indicated that
even four to six years after a rape, 26% of the victims had not
recovered from or adjusted to the assault.2 6 Because the presence
subset in which the trauma is rape").
'9 DSM-III at 236 (cited in note 14).
'0 See note 12.
Burgess and Holmstrom, 131 Am J Psych at 984 (cited in note 2).
22 Massaro, 69 Minn L Rev at 447 (cited in note 13).
21 428 A2d 126.
2 Id at 140.
26 Concerning the frequency of multiple rapes, see Ruch and Hennessy, Sexual Assault:
Victim and Attack Dimensions, 7 Victimology 94, 103 (1982). While the authors focused on
the interaction of various life stresses with the stress generated by a rape, it is important to
note that 17% of the subjects were victims of earlier sexual assaults. Other studies have
estimated the frequency of multiple rapes to more than 60%. See P. Frazier and E. Borgida,
Juror Common Understanding and the Admissibility of Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence
in Court, 12 Law and Human Behavior 101, 109 (1988).
" Ann Wolbert Burgess and Linda Lytle Holstrom, Rape: Crisis & Recovery 407-48
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of RTS in a victim of a prior rape could result from the first rape
rather than the incident at trial, it may not prove the absence of
consent in a particular instance. Second, some researchers have ar-
gued that although the presence of RTS indicates that a person
has been a victim of rape, the absence of the syndrome does not
necessarily indicate that a person has not been raped. These re-
searchers feel that because a significant percentage of rape victims
do not exhibit symptoms of RTS,27 the absence of RTS does not
necessarily indicate that a woman has not been raped.28 Others
have argued that because most victims of rape do show symptoms
of RTS, the fact that RTS is not present is important evidence
that the woman has not been raped.2 9
II. DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS TO USE
RTS EVIDENCE
A. Constitutional Rights
1. Due Process
The Supreme Court has stated that "[tihe right of an accused
in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair
opportunity to defend against the State's accusations.""0 Due pro-
cess concerns are implicated by the use of RTS evidence when the
prosecution seeks to restrict pretrial examination of the com-
plaining witness regarding RTS-related issues or limit discovery
and use of the state's RTS evidence.
There are two basic scenarios involving the use of RTS evi-
dence that give rise to due process considerations. If an examina-
tion for RTS is positive, due process may demand that the defend-
ant have some effective means of rebutting the testimony of the
prosecution's expert. If an examination for RTS is negative, the
defendant may seek to discover this fact and the Due Process
Clause may provide him a means to do this. There is uncertainty
in both situations, however. In the former, while there is a clear
tradition of allowing defendants the opportunity to have their own
(1979), cited in Massaro, 69 Minn L Rev at 426 n 133 (cited in note 13).
27 See Burgess and Holmstrom, 131 Am J Psych at 983 (cited in note 2) (14 out of 90
rape victims in the Boston City Hospital study did not exhibit RTS symptoms).
28 See Massaro, 69 Minn L Rev at 455 n 247 (cited in note 13); State v McQuillen, 236
Kan 161, 689 P2d 822, 830 (1984) ("[tlhere are no statistics to show that there is any value
to a negative finding that the rape trauma syndrome is not exhibited by the alleged
victim").
" See McCord, 26 BC L Rev at 1210-11 (cited in note 5).
Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284, 294 (1973).
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experts rebut the testimony of prosecution witnesses, there is con-
fusion concerning exactly what RTS evidence proves and to what
degree the defendant is entitled to rebut it. In the latter case,
when the prosecution does not seek to enter evidence concerning
RTS, the defendant's right to discover this evidence and enter it
himself will depend upon how significant the evidence might have
been.
When prosecutors use expert testimony against defendants,
there is a long history of courts allowing the defendant an opportu-
nity to rebut the testimony when, for example, the defense claims
the right to answer the prosecution's expert testimony with its own
expert testimony.3' Thus, when the prosecution plans to use expert
testimony suggesting the presence of RTS, this long-standing prin-
ciple would suggest that the defendant may present his own RTS
expert to rebut. In State v McQuillen,2 the Kansas Supreme
Court announced, without citing any particular authority, that
where the state introduces expert testimony on RTS the defense
may offer its own expert witness in rebuttal, in addition to cross-
examining the prosecution's expert witness.33 The court wrote,
"[w]hen consent to intercourse is the issue and the state's expert
has testified that the victim is suffering from rape trauma syn-
drome ... [t]he defendant may bring in his own expert witness in
rebuttal to testify that the victim is not suffering from rape trauma
syndrome. '
The New Mexico Supreme Court confronted a similar issue in
State v Garcia,5 although the case did not specifically involve
RTS evidence. In Garcia, the prosecution claimed that the com-
plainant suffered mental anguish as a result of the alleged rape .3
The allegation that the victim suffered a personal injury (mental
anguish) elevated the charge to a second degree from a third de-
gree felony.3 7 The New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that once the
prosecution made mental anguish an essential element of the crime
charged, the complaining witness' mental condition was relevant to
" See United States v Caserta, 199 F2d 905, 908-09 (3d Cir 1952) (defendant in a tax
evasion case wrongfully denied the opportunity to have his expert rebut government's ex-
pert testimony); State v Fendler, 127 Ariz 458, 622 P2d 23, 33 (1980). See also Comment,
Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: Admissibility and Effective Use in Crimi-
nal Rape Prosecutions, 33 Am U L Rev 417, 459 (1984).
32 689 P2d 822.
13 Id at 830.
34 Id.
3- 94 NM 583, 613 P2d 725 (1980).
SO 613 P2d at 727.
37 Id.
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the charge, and the defendant had the right to conduct a psycho-
logical examination of the complaining witness, subject to protec-
tive orders in conformity with the rape shield law.38
It should be noted, however, that not all states have ruled that
the defense can rebut the prosecution's RTS evidence through a
psychiatric examination of its own. In State v Liddell,39 for exam-
ple, the Montana Supreme Court held that even though the prose-
cution had introduced RTS evidence into the trial, the defense
could cross-examine the prosecution's expert but could not ex-
amine the victim with its own psychologist. 0 Using rather confus-
ing reasoning, the court held that because the act of rape was at
issue (rather than the victim's state of mind), the trial court was
not required to order a psychological examination.4
Thus, when the prosecution places RTS evidence into issue,
courts may allow the defense to have its own psychiatrist examine
the victim. This is less true where the prosecution does not offer
RTS evidence or the complaining witness's mental condition is in
issue. The McQuillen court refused to allow the defense to present
RTS evidence where the prosecution had not introduced evidence
of RTS. The court concluded that negative test results had no pro-
bative value because no meaning could be attached to negative test
results.4
An alternative line of reasoning supporting the McQuillen ap-
proach is founded on the trial court's discretion in ordering mental
examinations of witnesses. 3 Under this theory, the defendant has
no absolute right to a mental examination of an opposing witness.
It is within the trial court's equitable discretion to compel such an
examination; the power to order the examination should be exer-
cised sparingly given its intrusiveness. Once the prosecution offers
RTS evidence, however, fundamental fairness requires that the de-
fendant be afforded an opportunity to rebut that evidence through
his expert's examination.
When the results of an examination for RTS evidence are neg-
ative, the prosecutor will presumably not enter the results into evi-
'" Id at 729.
" 211 Mont 180, 685 P2d 918 (1984).
4" Id at 923-24. The Liddell court also reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise would permit
the defense to try the victim of the crime and divert the jury's attention from the primary
issue-guilt or innocence of the defendant." Id at 924. See text accompanying notes 69-77.
" Id at 924.
" 689 P2d at 830.
"' McCord, 26 BC L Rev at 1211 (cited in note 5), citing United States v Roach, 590
F2d 181 (5th Cir 1979), and United States v Jackson, 576 F2d 46 (5th Cir 1978).
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dence. The defendant might want this evidence admitted giving
rise to the issue of whether, according to the Due Process Clause,
the prosecution must furnish the evidence to the defendant. In a
rape trial where the only issue is consent, if sufficient weight is
accorded a negative finding, then the evidence might well be con-
sidered exculpatory. The Supreme Court has ruled that "the sup-
pression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment . ... "'I"
The Supreme Court's latest explanation of the prosecution's
duty to disclose came in United States v Bagley.45 In Bagley, a
plurality held that both the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence
after a specific request and the failure to disclose exculpatory evi-
dence after no request (or a general request) would constitute a
due process violation only if there was a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence come in, it would have altered the outcome
of the trial.46
Whether a negative finding of RTS would undermine the out-
come would then depend on the circumstances of the case, includ-
ing what other evidence there was concerning the issue of consent.
At least one court has found that negative RTS evidence, unlike
positive RTS evidence, is inadmissible because it is irrelevant. 47 If
the only evidence on the issue of consent, apart from relatively
credible but contradictory testimony by the defendant and the vic-
tim, is a negative RTS examination it is quite conceivable that en-
tering the evidence would undermine the outcome of a conviction.
This would provide the defendant the right to obtain and use this
evidence, and suggests again the need for a way to use RTS evi-
dence that minimizes harm to the victim.
2. Confrontation Clause
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees a de-
fendant in a criminal prosecution the right "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him .... 48 In the RTS context, the defense
" Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87 (1963).
45 105 SCt 3375 (1985).
46 Id.
17 McQuillen, 689 P2d at 830. The court wrote:
Nor may a defendant present evidence that the victim was not suffering from rape
trauma syndrome where the state has not first introduced evidence that the victim
was suffering from rape trauma syndrome. There are no statistics to show that
there is any value to a negative finding that the rape trauma syndrome is not
exhibited by the alleged victim.
See also notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
4" US Const, Amend VI. See Pennsylvania v Ritchie, 107 SCt 989, 998 (1987) ("[tlhe
399] . 407
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could assert Confrontation Clause rights to: (1) effectively cross-
examine the prosecution's witnesses; (2) have its own psychiatrist
examine the victim for RTS; and (3) obtain psychiatric informa-
tion and reports in preparation for cross-examination at trial."9
In Chambers v Mississippi,50 however, the Supreme Court in-
dicated that the right to confront and cross-examine was not abso-
lute but sometimes limited by competing interests in the trial.'
The Court has not clearly defined under what circumstances com-
peting interests outweigh Confrontation Clause rights. In RTS
cases, the rape victim's privacy rights are weighed against the de-
fendant's Confrontation Clause rights of access to RTS evidence.
The Court held in Davis v Alaska,52 a decision with some analogies
to the privacy concerns in a rape case, that the state's interest in
keeping private a witness' record as a juvenile offender could not
overcome the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. The Court
noted that "[w]hatever temporary embarrassment might result to
[the witness] or his family by disclosure of his juvenile record-if
the prosecution insisted on using him to make its case-is out-
weighed by petitioner's right to probe into the influence of possible
bias on the testimony of a crucial identification witness. '53
But in a rape trial, there are at least two reasons why the vic-
tim's privacy interest is stronger than the privacy interest of a ju-
venile offender acting as a witness. First, when a rape victim's pri-
vacy is invaded at trial, the use of the evidence elicited directly
from the witness benefits the defendant by strengthening his con-
sent defense. This use is more serious and damaging than adverse
inferences regarding credibility of a witness. Second, much more
than the "temporary embarrassment" mentioned in Davis is at
stake when a rape victim is forced to reveal her past sexual history
on the stand. As Susan Estrich has asserted, "[w]hat makes rape
... different from other crimes is that rape is a sexual violation-a
violation of the most personal, most intimate, and most offensive
kind." '54 It therefore seems reasonable for a court to find that a
Confrontation Clause provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right
physically to face those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-
examination").
49 See Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 428 A2d at 133 (court held rape crisis center in
contempt for refusing to turn over a report containing details of complainant's rape and
subsequent request for counseling services).
50 410 US 284 (1973).
51 Id at 295.
62 415 US 308 (1974).
" Id at 319-20.
" Susan Estrich, Real Rape 103-04 (Harvard University Press, 1987).
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victim's privacy interests, coupled with society's interest in encour-
aging more rape prosecutions, trumps the defendant's Confronta-
tion Clause rights.
There are, nevertheless, two contexts in which the victim's pri-
vacy rights must be balanced against the defendant's Confronta-
tion Clause rights in RTS cases: when the defense seeks to have its
own psychiatrist examine the victim for RTS and when it seeks to
obtain psychiatric information and reports in preparation for
cross-examination at trial. Because the former was explored earlier
as part of closely-related due process considerations,5 5 this discus-
sion will concentrate on the latter problem of discovery of RTS
evidence.
In a recent case, Pennsylvania v Ritchie,5" the Supreme Court
considered a defendant's pretrial rights under the Confrontation
Clause. A plurality ruled that the Confrontation Clause granted
only a trial right, not a pretrial right.5 7 In Ritchie, a father was
prosecuted for incest and the rape of his 13-year-old daughter. The
prosecution sought to keep the defendant from reading the vic-
tim's file compiled by a child abuse agency. The Court found that
because the defense was able to fully cross-examine the witness at
trial, no Confrontation Clause violation occurred." The plurality
noted that extending the effect of the Confrontation Clause in the
manner the defendant suggested would "transform the Confronta-
tion Clause into a constitutionally-compelled rule of pretrial dis-
covery."59 Ritchie, then, provides a constitutional basis on which to
assert that a defendant may not be able to obtain discovery of the
result of an RTS examination performed by a complainant's
therapist.60
"I See pp 404-07.
86 107 SCt 989.
" Id at 999. The Court wrote: "The opinions of this Court show that the right of con-
frontation is a trial right, designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of ques-
tions that defense counsel may ask during cross-examination."
8 Id at 1003. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun asserted that the Confronta-
tion Clause provides greater rights in preparation for trial. Id at 1004-06. He concurred
rather than dissented because, under its due process analysis, the plurality found that the
trial judge should review the files to decide whether any of the information was material to
the defense. Justice Blackmun concluded that this in camera determination was sufficient to
protect the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. Id at 1006.
" Id at 999. Note that the compelled discovery the Court avoids in Ritchie can be
distinguished from that contained in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(D), which
is a right of discovery the defendant has against the prosecution, not against a third party
such as the agency involved in Ritchie.
"0 The jurisprudence in this area is strongly influenced by rape shield laws. See pp 411-
14. It should be noted, however, that the privacy interests involved in an RTS examination
399]
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3. Compulsory Process
Compulsory process rights are closely related to rights under
the Confrontation and Due Process Clauses. The Compulsory Pro-
cess Clause states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor."'" In the RTS context, a defendant may ar-
gue that his compulsory process rights entitle him to: examine the
report to see if any information may lead to exposing a favorable
witness; 62 call the complainant's examining psychiatrist as a de-
fense witness when the report is negative, or determine if there is
any favorable evidence in the report.
The Supreme Court has rarely considered the extent and lim-
its of the Compulsory Process Clause. 3 In interpreting rights of
compulsory process, the Court has sometimes relied on the fairness
notions of the Due Process Clause. 4 In Ritchie, the Court used a
due process analysis to analyze a compulsory process claim in a
rape case. 5 The Court concluded that although "compulsory pro-
cess provides no greater protections in this area than those af-
forded by due process, we need not decide today whether and how
the guarantees of the Compulsory Process Clause differ from those
of the Fourteenth Amendment."" The Court has also compared
the Confrontation Clause rights to compulsory process rights in
that they both derive from the Due Process Clause. 7
may be less compelling than some of the broader privacy interests protected by rape shield
laws. If properly supervised and limited by the court, an examination simply to determine
the presence or absence of RTS would be much less intrusive than some of the procedures
that the rape shield laws were originally intended to exclude, such as detailed examination
of a woman's sexual history and attitudes. For a review of the rationale and design of rape
shield laws, see Comment, Sexual Harassment Cases and the Law of Evidence: A Proposed
Rule, 1989 U Chi Legal F 219.
"' US Const, VI Amend. See U.S. v Nixon, 418 US 683, 709 (1974), in which the Court
noted that "[t]o ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that
compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the prose-
cution or the defense."
" Ritchie, 107 SCt at 1000.
63 Id at 1000.
"4 See Charles H. Whitebread and Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure 685 (The
Foundation' Press, Inc., 2d ed 1986). In Washington v Texas, 388 US 14, 19 (1967), the
Court used the Due Process Clause to extend compulsory process rights to defendants in
state criminal actions by finding a Texas law disqualifying testimony of an accomplice viola-
tive of the Sixth Amendment.
" 107 SCt at 1001.
66 Id.
67 "Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the pur-
pose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to estab-
lish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law." Washington, 388
US at 19.
[1989:
RTS AND NEUTRAL EXPERTS
In summary, the rape defendant's right to a fair trial inherent
in the Due Process Clause only allows him to have his expert ex-
amine a complaining witness when the prosecution intends to in-
troduce positive RTS evidence. The Confrontation Clause affords
him no additional rights during the pretrial period. The Compul-
sory Process Clause gives the defendant no rights not contained in
his Due Process rights. The totality of the defendant's rights,
moreover, are weighed against the significant, recognized interests
of rape victims, as well as of society, in protecting the privacy of
victims' past sexual history and supporting their efforts to recover
from the trauma of rape.
B. Statutory Rights: Rape Shield Laws
Rape shield laws are designed to guard the privacy interests of
complaining witnesses. While they vary widely in their specific
provisions, these laws primarily operate to protect the witness by
restricting inquiry into her past sexual history. 9 The general ex-
clusion of sexual history evidence is justified on the grounds that
its slight relevance is outweighed by concerns for the privacy inter-
ests of rape victims. Admitting RTS evidence could open up in-
quiry into a victim's past sexual history, contrary to the prohibi-
tions of shield laws.
One court has ruled that the limited nature of the RTS in-
quiry prevents it from violating that state's rape shield statute.7 0
The unique nature of RTS evidence would require only a limited
examination of one aspect of a person's sexual history-the exis-
tence of prior incidents of nonconsensual intercourse. RTS evi-
dence, however, demonstrates only that a victim has experienced a
prior incident of nonconsensual sexual intercourse. The presence of
RTS does not link any specific sexual act to the observed symp-
toms."' As a result, evidence of a previous rape becomes relevant
8 See, for example, Federal Rule of Evidence 412. For a comprehensive analysis of the
provisions and purposes of rape shield statutes, see J. Alexander Tanford and Anthony J.
Bocchino, Rape Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U Penn L Rev 544 (1980).
69 For categorizations of rape shield laws and analysis of the impact and effectiveness of
those statutes, see Comment, The Rape Shield Paradox: Complainant Protection Amidst
Oscillating Trends of State Judicial Interpretation, 78 J Crim L & Criminol 645 (1987),
and Comment, Rape Shield Statutes: Constitutional Despite Unconstitutional Exclusions
of Evidence, 1985 Wis L Rev 1219 (1985).
70 McQuillen, 689 P2d at 830.
" Holmstrom and Burgess indicate that there may be special problems with victims of
multiple rapes. Ann Wolbert Burgess and Linda Lytle Holmstrom, Assessing Trauma in the
Rape Victim, in D. Nass, ed, The Rape Victim 111-12 (Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1977).
They identify these problems as compounded and silent reactions. Compounded reactions
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for its power to explain the existence of RTS.72 Any wider inquiry
would run the risk of violating the intention of rape shield stat-
utes. One court indicated that if the prosecution's expert bases his
or her RTS diagnosis on a wide-ranging inquiry into the victim's
past sexual history, the defendant's expert can bring in past sexual
conduct to rebut the prosecution expert's testimony; the court im-
plied, however, that this would be an unusual case.73
Another potential use of RTS evidence to circumvent the pur-
poses of rape shield statutes is illustrated by the defendant's tac-
tics in Spencer v General Electric Co..74 In that case the defendant
attempted to introduce evidence that, since the time of the alleged
rape, the complaining witness had participated in consensual sex-
ual activity. Because a common symptom of RTS is loss of interest
in sexual activity, evidence of post-rape sexual activity would be
inconsistent with a finding of RTS. The court, however, did not
reach the issue of the relation between the evidence offered and
the purposes of rape shield statutes, ruling instead that the RTS
testimony was inadmissible because it was scientifically suspect 75
and because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.76
While, due to the nature of RTS evidence, inquiry into past
nonconsensual intercourse is more legitimate than inquiry into
past sexual history of consensual sex, any examination of prior sex-
ual history is contrary to both the spirit behind statutory provi-
sions prohibiting inquiry into past sexual history and previous de-
cisions holding that evidence of past rapes should be excluded.77
Those statutes and decisions justify exclusion based on a balancing
of the minimal relevance of such evidence against the privacy in-
occur when a subsequent assault reactivates previous symptoms. Silent reactions occur in
victims who experience symptoms but have not revealed that there was a prior rape. With a
complaining witness who has previously been victimized, the problem for the court is deter-
mining whether the symptoms are a silent reaction from a previous rape or a product of the
incident giving rise to the complaint.
It should be noted that this problem of deciding from which rape RTS arises is not
without parallel in rape prosecutions. Physical bruises are used as evidence in rape trials
even though it is not always certain from which event the bruises arose. Massaro, 69 Minn L
Rev at 441 (cited in note 13).
72 See DePaul, The Rape Trauma Syndrome: New Weapon for Prosecutors, Natl L J
21 (Oct 28, 1985). This article notes that a defendant's showing that the victim's history
revealed RTS prior to the rape could possibly destroy the probative value of RTS evidence.
70 McQuillen, 689 P2d at 830.
7' 688 F Supp 1072 (E D Va 1988).
71 Id at 1076.
16 Id at 1077.
17 See, for example, Hollis v State, 380 S2d 409 (Ala Crim App 1980) (court held that a
prior rape trial is irrelevant to the issue of consent in a later rape trial).
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terest of the complaining witness. That balance is shifted when the
prosecution introduces RTS evidence on the issue of consent and
that evidence can be explained by another rape in the victim's
past. Thus, the discoverability of past rapes in the RTS situation is
more likely than the discoverability of general sexual history for
two reasons: First, the scope of the inquiry is more narrow and,
second, the existence of a past rape is more relevant to RTS than
general sexual history is to the issue of consent.
It is important to note that many rape shield laws would not
bar evidence of past nonconsensual sexual conduct if it is used in
response to RTS evidence. While very few rapes are federal of-
fenses, reference to the federal rape shield statute is instructive, as
many state rape shield laws are modeled on it.78 Evidence of prior,
nonconsensual intercourse may be admissible to rebut RTS evi-
dence through two exceptions to the general prohibitions of rape
shield statutes.79 First, the evidence may be "constitutionally re-
quired to be admitted" according to FRE 412(b)(1). The defendant
could avail himself of the constitutional guarantees of the Due
Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment." In Government of
Virgin Islands v Jacobs,81 the court held that the defendant's Con-
frontation Clause rights entitled him to cross-examine the alleged
rape victim on prosecution evidence asserting she was a virgin
before the alleged assault.8 2 Second, the defendant could make a
motion to offer evidence of prior nonconsensual intercourse accord-
ing to the procedure provided in FRE 412(c). 3 In summary, rape
shield laws may not provide complete protection against admission
of evidence regarding prior nonconsensual intercourse, but the vic-
tim's interests in privacy would, at the least, be weighed by a bal-
ancing of interests in a constitutional analysis or be considered by
a judge in a mini-trial on the probative value of the defense's pro-
posed offering.
78 See Jack B. Weinstein, Weinstein on Evidence, 412-14 - 412-27 (1981)
("Weinstein").
' A third plausible exception to the general rule is that which allows admission of evi-
dence to prove that the accused was not the source of "injury." FRE 412(b)(l(A). For the
purposes of this rule, "injury" does not apply to "emotional injuries unaccompanied by a
cognizable physical consequence." United States v Shaw, 824 F2d 601, 603 n 3 (8th Cir
1987), citing 124 Cong Rec 34913 (1978). RTS would fall into this category.
80 See pp 404-10.
8 634 F Supp 933 (D Virgin Islands 1986).
82 Id at 938.
8 The court would then hold a mini-trial to determine the relevancy and probative
value of the evidence the defendant seeks to admit. The court may decide to have the evi-
dence admitted pursuant to restrictions in a court order. See FRE 412(c)(2), (3).
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III. EXAMINATION FOR RTS BY A COURT-APPOINTED NEUTRAL
EXPERT
A. The Problem With the Current Practice of Eliciting RTS
Evidence
Psychological examinations are by nature intrusive. In order
to assess a person's psychological state, psychologists must ask
probing questions that can cause a person to relive unpleasant ex-
periences. Rape victims have been invaded and traumatized by the
initial assault. Thus, the potential for further damage during psy-
chological examinations should be minimized whenever possible.
The victim is exposed to the most risk of continued trauma
when the court allows multiple psychological examinations to take
place. Separate examinations performed by experts chosen by the
prosecution and by the defense pose two potential problems. The
first is simple multiplication: the more exams, the greater the in-
trusion." The second problem lies in the nature of the exams. Al-
though theoretically neutral, an expert secured by the defense can
pose a greater danger to the interests of the victim than one se-
cured by the prosecution:
While a mental health professional does conduct the ex-
amination, no prior treatment relationship has been es-
tablished and the expert is a stranger to the victim. Ex-
amination by the defendant's expert can be especially
excruciating and terrorizing. This examiner is perceived
by the victim as an extension of the defendant and she
can feel as though she were being raped emotionally by
the defendant once again.85
In an analogous situation, that of an examination of a rape victim
for competency to be a witness, Massachusetts has recognized that
a partisan psychiatrist can use "the examination as an adversarial
tool, to harass or embarrass the person examined." '
84 Note that if the sole objection is to the number of exams, a possible solution could be
a single examination by both sides' experts at once. Such an examination, however, could be
stressful for reasons discussed below.
8 Buchele, 25 Washburn L J at 39 (cited in note 8).
" Commonwealth v Gibbons, 393 NE2d 400, 402 (Mass 1979). Massachusetts has en-
acted a statute to provide for appointment of a neutral psychiatrist in this situation. See
Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 123, §19 (West 1970).
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B. Court Appointment of a Neutral Expert
To combat the problem of multiple intrusive and traumatic
examinations by a defense psychiatrist, a judge could appoint a
neutral expert to administer a single RTS examination to the com-
plainant.8 7 Federal judges have the inherent power to appoint neu-
tral experts, 8 and this power has been codified in FRE 706.89 Rule
706 allows the court to appoint an expert witness on its own mo-
tion or on the motion of a party. In a criminal case the expert is
compensated "from funds which may be payable by law."' 0 Judges
rarely use Rule 706.91 It is used most often in complex technical
situations where partisan experts arrive at divergent conclusions
and the fact-finder has a difficult time determining how to evaluate
the truth of the expert testimony.92 This is most often the case in
civil trials.9 3 The proposed use of the rule in RTS cases, to protect
the victim from the intrusions inherent in multiple psychological
examinations, is unusual. 4 In both cases, however, Rule 706 has
the potential to increase the efficiency of a trial by reducing the
amount of information a fact-finder must review and, in the RTS
case, by reducing the psychic cost shouldered by the victim. 5
" See Comment 33 Am U L Rev 417, 456 n 329 (cited in note 31).
" See, for example, Scott v Spanger Bros., Inc., 298 F2d 928, 930 (2d Cir 1962) (court
held that appointment of an impartial medical expert by trial court was within its sound
discretion).
" Again, most rapes are state, not federal, crimes. Many states have adopted FRE 706
verbatim or virtually verbatim. See Theodore I. Botter, The Court-Appointed Impartial
Expert, in Melvin D. Kraft, ed, Using Experts in Civil Cases 68-69 (Practicing Law Insti-
tute, 1982) ("[o]f the 20 states that have largely adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, all
but five .. .have adopted Rule 706, either verbatim or a variant thereof... "). For an in-
depth examination of state adaptations of Rule 706, see Weinstein at 706-29-39 (cited in
note 78).
o FRE 706(b).
" See Weinstein at 706-10 (cited in note 78).
2 See Botter, Court-Appointed Impartial Experts at 75-76 (cited in note 89).
93 For example, one of the leading cases concerning the use of Rule 706 involved the
appointment of a seismic safety expert to evaluate the safety of the location of a school for
the blind. Students of Cal School for the Blind v Honig, 736 F2d 538 (9th Cir 1984), va-
cated on other grounds, 471 US 148, 105 SCt 1820 (1985). In approving the appointment of
the neutral expert, the court noted that the district court's decision to exercise its power
under Rule 706 was reviewable only for abuse of discretion. 736 F2d at 549.
"4 Courts have used neutral experts in other types of cases, such as those in which the
state has an interest (for example, commitment of mental incompetents or child custody
cases). See Botter, Court-Appointed Impartial Experts at 78-79 (cited in note 89).
" The procedural efficiency of court-appointed experts is accompanied by safeguards
that ensure the cost (in terms of due process rights) is not shifted to the defendant.
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C. Complainant's Interests and Rule 706 Experts
Although the appointment of an impartial expert under Rule
706 would meet some of the concerns arising from multiple exami-
nations of a rape victim, this procedure could also create problems.
One problem that might arise is victim resentment of the proceed-
ing if it were perceived as a continuation of the tradition of rou-
tinely ordering rape complainants to undergo a psychiatric exami-
nation at the outset of a trial. In the past, all courts required rape
victims to take psychiatric examinations because of a belief that
the rape charge was the result of delusions.96 This practice has
been sharply criticized and curtailed.97
The proposed examination for evidence of RTS would be less
objectionable, in terms of both scope and purpose, than a psychiat-
ric examination to determine the stability of a rape victim. An ex-
amination for the presence of RTS is far more limited than an ex-
amination of past and present sexual attitudes and experiences. It
is focused on current behavioral responses or attitudes, many of
which are unrelated to sex. Moreover, while any psychological ex-
amination may be intrusive, an examination designed to bolster
the victim's claims seems unlikely to be perceived as intrusive as
one designed to challenge them. Even an examination for RTS
that is negative would not necessarily be used to impeach the com-
plainant's charge. Like all examinations of a victim for evidence, a
psychological examination for RTS necessarily involves some
intrusion.
Despite the limited scope of the RTS examination, the com-
plainant might not wish to undergo the examination. Under Rule
706, either party can request the expert or the court can order the
expert on its own motion. Thus a woman could find herself with
less control over whether or not to undergo the exam at all than
" "Today it is unanimously held ... by experienced psychiatrists that the complainant
woman in a sex offense should always be examined by competent experts to ascertain
whether she suffers from some mental or moral delusion or tendency, frequently found espe-
cially in young girls, causing distortion of the imagination in sex cases.. ." 3A J. Wigmore,
Evidence § 924a, 746-47 (Chadbourne Rev., 1970), cited in Roberta J. O'Neale, Court Or-
dered Psychiatric Examination of a Rape Victim in a Criminal Rape Prosecution-or How
Many Times Must a Woman Be Raped?, 18 Santa Clara L Rev 119, 120 (1978).
"7 See State v Romero, 94 NM 22, 606 P2d 1116, 1121 (1980): "While some authorities
have taken the position that psychological examinations should be routinely ordered in rape
cases ... we feel that this rule is based on outmoded notions of the instability and duplicity
of women in general and, as such, should be discarded altogether."
For a good summary of various jurisdictions' rulings on court-ordered psychiatric exam-
inations, see Ballard v Superior Court of San Diego County, 49 Cal Rptr 302, 410 P2d 838
(1966).
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she would have under the present system. This is because under
the present system many jurisdictions refuse to admit RTS evi-
dence unless the prosecution introduces it, and the prosecution will
probably be more responsive to the victim's wishes than the de-
fense will be."' It is not clear that the same rule would hold under
a Rule 706 system. However, since some courts only consider posi-
tive, and not negative, RTS evidence admissible, the defense
should have no legitimate interest in requesting an RTS examina-
tion in the absence of such a request by the prosecution. Thus
courts would be justified in ordinarily appointing neutral experts
only upon the prosecution's request.
Even if a judge were to order a victim to undergo an RTS ex-
amination against her wishes, the sanctions that a court could ap-
ply against both her and the prosecution would probably be lim-
ited if she refused to submit to the order."' In addition, courts have
held that the simple fact that a victim has refused to submit to a
psychiatric examination is not grounds for dismissal of the sex of-
One proposal for dealing with the situation where the prosecution is not responsive
to the wishes of the victim is the interlocutory appeal. In Doe v United States, 666 F2d 43
(4th Cir 1981), the Fourth Circuit held that the victim had a right to pursue an interlocu-
tory appeal of the trial court's decision to allow the admission of evidence of past sexual
behavior. The determination that the victim had standing was based upon the provisions of
FRE 412, which the court held implicitly gave her a right to interlocutory appeal.
In the absence of the prosecution's introduction of RTS evidence, federal and state rape
shield statutes and court decisions would bar the defense from introducing evidence of a
previous rape. As the prosecution has no right to present RTS evidence, and the presenta-
tion of such evidence opens up inquiry by the defense into the witness's sexual history, the
only effective remedy is to allow the victim to appeal the court's initial decision to allow the
introduction of RTS.
For a discussion of interlocutory appeals under rape shield laws, see Comment, Rape
Shield Statutes: Constitutional Despite Unconstitutional Exclusions of Evidence, 1985
Wis L Rev 1219, 1225 n 22 (1985), and sources cited therein.
9 Note that there are viable policy reasons for not forcing a rape victim to submit to an
examination. See State v Clontz, 305 NC 116, 286 SE2d 793, 797 (1982) ("[t]o order the
victim of a sex crime to unwillingly submit to a psychiatric examination would be a
profound invasion of her privacy which, in our opinion, would deter innocent victims of such
crimes from ever making complaints"); State v Miller, 35 Wis2d 454, 151 NW2d 157, 165
(1967); Annotation, Necessity or Permissibility of Mental Examination to Determine Com-
petency or Credibility of Complainant in Sexual Offense Prosecution, 45 ALR4th 310, 328-
30 (1986).
In an analogous situation, many courts have ruled that a court cannot compel the com-
plaining witness to undergo an examination for competency. However, it has been held that
a victim who refuses to undergo a competency examination cannot testify at trial. See Peo-
ple v Mills, 151 Cal Rptr 71, 75-76 (Cal App 1978); Annotation, Permissibility of Mental
Examination, 45 ALR4th at 376-78. Some courts have mandated competency examinations
on constitutional grounds. See, for example, Ledbetter v United States, 350 A2d 379, 380
(DC App 1976).
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fense charges. 00 To the extent that this precludes a defendant
from having any effective means of countering RTS evidence, a
judge in such a case can simply exclude the RTS evidence
altogether.
D. Defendant's Objections
The defendant who faces a prosecution case employing RTS
evidence will probably want to call his own expert witness. The
RTS evidence can be crucial to the defendant because the most
successful defense to rape charges may be consent.' 1 To this end,
the defendant will point to Rule 706(d) which provides that
"[n]othing in this rule limits the parties in calling expert witnesses
of their own selection."'' 0 The defendant will claim the right to
have his psychiatrist examine the victim in addition to the court-
appointed psychiatrist's examination. This would obviously negate
the benefits of having a court-appointed psychiatrist.'0 3 Rule
706(d) merely provides, however, that nothing in that rule pre-
cludes the parties from calling their own experts. The court could
nevertheless refuse to allow the parties to conduct psychological
examinations relying on other authority.
There are various procedures under Rule 706 which could
minimize the defendant's, as well as the prosecution's, concerns
about a court-appointed expert and the effect on the parties' trial
strategies. In the first place, Rule 706(a) provides that the court
may appoint an expert agreed upon by the parties. As a practical
matter, the prosecution and the defense might have an incentive to
agree on a list of experts for the court to appoint because, if they
do not, the judge can still appoint the expert of his or her own
choice. It should be noted however that nothing in the rule pres-
ently requires the judge to appoint an expert agreed upon by the
parties. One jurisdiction has experimented with a rotation system,
where a judge appointing a neutral expert simply takes the next
available expert on a centralized list of eligible experts.0
100 See, for example, Mills, 151 Cal Rptr at 75-76; Annotation, Permissibility of Mental
Examination, 45 ALR4th at 376-78.
101 For a study demonstrating the effectiveness of the consent defense, see Robert A.
Weninger, Factors Affecting the Prosecution of Rape: A Case Study of Travis County,
Texas, 64 Va L Rev 357, 360-62 (1978).
102 FRE 706(d).
,o* In the alternative, a panel of three psychiatrists could examine the victim, one on
the appointment of each of the parties and one appointed by the court. The neutral expert
could monitor the questioning from both sides to protect the interests of each party.
10' See Botter, Court-Appointed Impartial Experts at 56 (cited in note 89).
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Another safeguard for the parties' interests is the fact that,
under Rule 706(a), the parties have-the right to depose and cross-
examine the expert. This is the only place in federal criminal pro-
cedure where a deposition may be taken as of right.10 5 Taking dep-
ositions before trial can help the party disfavored by the expert
testimony prepare a rebuttal.'06 In addition, Rule 706 permits the
parties to cross-examine the expert at trial, allowing the right to
ask leading questions and bring out material beyond the expert's
direct testimony.'0 7
At any rate, it is not clear that the defendant can assert his
right to his own psychiatric testimony. As Justice Rehnquist re-
cently stated,
[a] psychiatrist is not an attorney, whose job it is to ad-
vocate. His opinion is sought on a question that the State
... treats as a question of fact. Since any "unfairness" in
these cases would arise from the fact that the only com-
petent witnesses on the question are being hired by the
State, all the defendant should be entitled to is one com-
petent opinion-whatever the witness' conclusion-from
a psychiatrist who acts independently of the prosecutor's
office. Although the independent psychiatrist should be
available to answer defense counsel's questions prior to
trial, and to testify if called, I see no reason why the de-
fendant should be entitled to an opposing view, or to a
'defense' advocate.' 0 8
If a defendant is not constitutionally entitled to have an expert
advocate present testimony about his own mental state, surely he
is less entitled to have such an advocate present testimony about
the mental state of a third party.
E. Institutional Objections
There are general, institutional objections to the idea of a
court-appointed expert. One is the fear that the procedure will
,00 See Weinstein at 706-22 (cited in note 78).
300 Note that the state's right to take depositions raises Conflict Clause questions. See
Weinstein at 706-23 (cited in note 78).
307 See Unique Concepts, Inc. v Brown, 659 F Supp 1008, 1011 (S D NY 1987); Wein-
stein at 706-25.
,' Ake v Oklahoma, 470 US 68, 92 (1984) (Rehnquist dissenting). Note that in Ake the
majority found that the defendant had the right to a psychiatrist appointed by him to tes-
tify. That case is distinguishable from the RTS situation because it was a capital case and it
was the defendant who was to be examined.
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lead to trial by expert rather than trial by jury if an expert de-
clared to be neutral is accorded too much respect by the jury.1"9 In
a pre-Rule 706 decision, however, the Supreme Court ruled that a
court does not infringe upon the right to a jury trial by appointing
an expert because the jury remains the ultimate trier of fact. '
Overvaluation of the neutral expert's testimony can be mitigated
by vigorous deposition and cross-examination by the parties. Some
have suggested that by concealing an expert's court-appointed sta-
tus the expert's authority would not be overwhelming."' Under
Rule 706(c) the judge has the discretion whether to disclose the
expert's court-appointed status. Assuming, however, that the
court-appointed expert is the only expert testifying on RTS, the
jury may not understand why there is only one expert testifying.
Also, the expert as sole witness on this matter may acquire an un-
usual air of authority regardless of whether the judge discloses the
expert's "neutral" status.
Others have alleged that the court's imprimatur will give a
false sense of neutrality, which is dangerous because experts will
always bring biases of their own into their testimony. 1 2 However a
good expert witness will reveal her or his own biases and the par-
ties will ferret out these biases at trial. Careful jury instructions by
the judge will also help solve this problem. A final objection is that
appointing a neutral expert subverts the traditional ideals of ad-
versarial proceedings. Others welcome this effect." '
CONCLUSION
RTS evidence can be an important tool in negating the de-
fendant's consent defense. Although its use raises certain constitu-
tional and statutory difficulties, they are not insurmountable. In
order to counteract some of the negative effects the use of RTS
evidence can have on complaining witnesses, courts can make psy-
chiatric examinations less traumatic for the victim by replacing the
parties' experts with a neutral expert. This proposed use of Rule
706 protects the rights of both defendants and victims and ad-
vances the truth-finding process.
oI See Kian v Mirro Aluminum Co., 88 FRD 351, 356 (D C Mich 1980); Weinstein at
706-11 (cited in note 78).
See In re Peterson, 253 US 300, 310-11 (1920).
I Weinstein at 706-13, 706-14.
"' See id at 706-12 (cited in note 78).
See id at 706-11.
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